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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KIRT OVERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No. 15470

UNITED STATES FIDELITY and
GUARA:-JTY COMPAHY aka
USF&G, an insurance company,
~efendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff
insured against defendant insurer to determine the effect of
coverage provisions of an insurance policy.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury, The Honorable J. Harlan Burns
presiding.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the court,

upon a motion for dismissal by the defendant, dismissed the
plaintiff's action with prejudice.

From the dismissal order, the

plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the dismissal order
and remand to the District Court for a trial on the merits to
thP jury.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff
against defendant insurance company.

Plaintiff seeks to compel

defendant insurance company to fulfill its obligation under an
insurance policy to defend plaintiff in an action brought against
plaintiff by Stephenson's, Inc., a Utah corporation, and pay

a~

judgment which may be rendered against the plaintiff therein up
to the policy limits.
Stephenson's, Inc.

(hereafter referred to as Stephenson's)

is an implement dealer in Holden, Utah.

Stephenson's entered into

a contract with Triple "C" Farms to construct two quonset type
metal buildings.

Stephenson's was to furnish both the materials

and the labor for the project.

Upon completion, the metal struc·

tures were to be used by Triple "C" Farms as potato storage
facilities.

Pursuant to its contract with Triple "C" Farms,

Stephenson's hired Kirt Overson as the subcontractor to do the
actual erecting and insulating of the metal structures.
Stephenson's furnished the prefabricated metal (Trial Court Trans·
cript, p. 12) and Overson put it together at the job site.
(Trial Court Transcript, p. 13).
Other subcontractors were also hired--some by Stephenson's
and some apparently by Triple "C" Farms.

One subcontractor did

the excavation work; another formed and poured the cement footings:
another subcontractor did the interior carpentry work; another d1d
the electrical wiring; and a different one did the ventilation
system.

(Trial Court Transcript, pp. 13-15).
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The construction process was supervised at each stage
~

Stephenson's and Triple "C" Farms.

PP· 24-26, 54-55).

(Trial Court Transcript,

After the buildings had been erected and

insulated, Stephenson's directed Overson to enlarge the size of
the ventilation louvers in the ends of the buildings.
court Transcript, pp. 24-25).

(Trial

While two of Overson's employees

were cutting off the head of a bolt with an acetylene torch so
they could enlarge the air vent, the insulation suddenly ignited.
The fire spread rapidly, completely destroying the building
within minutes.
Stephenson's filed a suit against Overson to recover for
damages sustained by reason of the fire.

Overson tendered the

defense to his insurer, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company.

The insurer refused to defend, claiming an exclusion

in the policy precluded Overson's coverage.

The policy provisions

in question read as follows:
This insurance does not apply:
(a)

To liability assumed by the insured
under any contract or agreement except
an incidental contract; but this exclusion does not apply to a warranty
of fitness or quality of the named
insured's products or a warranty that
work performed by or on behalf of the
named insured will be done in a workmanlike manner;

(k)

to property damage to

* * *
* * *
(3)

property in the care, custody, or
control of the insured or as to
which the insured is for any purpose exercising physical control.

* * *
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(o)

to property damage to work performed
by or on behalf of the named insured
arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials,
parts or equipment furnished in
connection therewith;

The refusal by USF&G, the defendant insurance company, to
defend plaintiff in the suit filed by Stephenson's spawned this
present action.

Plaintiff is seeking a declaration of defendant':

duty to defend and to pay any judgment up to the policy limits
which may be rendered.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A JUDGMENT
FOR DEFENDANT, THEREBY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF
OF HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, SINCE FACTS
AND ISSUES UPON WHICH REASONABLE MINDS
COULD DIFFER WERE RAISED AND REMAIN UNRESOLVED.
Rule 50 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

I

party to move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence I,
proffered by his opponent.
was made in the trial court.

It was under this rule that the mtiMI
I

The motion for a directed verdict should be granted only
cautiously, since it deprives the party of a determination of the
facts by a jury.

Wright

&

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,

Civil, §2524, and cases cited therein.

Ci ting from the Wright

Miller treatise:
In determining whether the evidence is
sufficient, the court is not free to weigh
the evidence or to pass upon the credibility
of witnesses or to substitute its judgment
of the facts for that of the jury.
Instead
it must view the evidence most favorable to
the party against whom the motion is made
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&

I

and give that party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the evidence.
(See cases cited therein.)
Perhaps the most concise statement of the test was stated
by the Second Circuit in Sirnblest v. Maynard, C.A.2d,

1970, 427

f.2d 1,4:
Simply stated, it is whether the evidence
is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise
considering the weight of the evidence,
there can be but one conclusion as to
the verdict that reasonable men could have
reached.
Utah follows the formulation for the test for a directed
verdict that has developed in the federal courts, since Utah's
Rule 50(a) is identical to the Federal Rule 50(a).

In the case

of Boskovich v. Utah Construction Company, 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d
885 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case on appeal

following a directed verdict for the defendant.

The question was

whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the
defendant.

The court said:
. . . In deciding a motion for a directed
verdict, the court must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to
the party against whom the motion is
directed and must resolve every controverted fact in his favor.
/Cites./
The inquiry, then, must be directed toward
whether reasonable minds could disagree
in the case on the evidence presented so
as to provide a question for the jury.

Also see Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952).
Remembering that all the evidence must be viewed most
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, the question comes down to the reasonable man test--whether the minds of

-5-
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reasonable men could differ.

The appellant maintains that

reasonable men could differ on the particulars of this case as
presented at trial because (A) the contract provisions ar

e

ambig~

1

and (B) several fact issues were raised needing jury determinatio:
A.

THE INSURANCE POLICY PROVISIONS RELIED UPON
BY THE DEFENDANT ARE AMBIGUOUS AND THEREBY
REQUIRE JURY INTERPRETATION.

The phrases of the insurance policy upon which the de~~
dant insurance company rely are not clear.

They are ambiguous.

The ~hrase "care, custody or control" is not defined anywhere~
the policy.

Rather, it is boiler-plate language found in almost

all industrial liability insurance policies.

These words, part

of the form contract written exclusively by the insurance company,
are purposefully kept general in nature in an attempt to exclude
coverage in a myriad of situations.

Numerous cases dealing with

identical or similar "care, custody or control" clauses have been
held to be ambiguous.
&

I

Arrigo' s Fleet Service, Inc. v. Aetna Life

Casualty Company, 54 Mich. App. 482, 221 N. W. 2d 206 (1974);

Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v.
Puyear Wood Products Company, 247 Ark. 673, 447 S.W.2d 139 (19691
Aetna Casualty

&

Surety Company v. Haas, 422 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1%!]·

Fall's Sheet Metal Work v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty

C~

17 Ohio App.2d 209, 245 N.E.2d 733 (1969).
Clause (o) of the insurance policy, cited supra, is equali:
general and devoid of specific meaning.
that the phrase is ambiguous.

Several courts have held

The Arizona Supreme Court, in

Federal Insurance Company v. P. A. T. Homes, Inc., 113 Ariz. 1361
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547 P.2d 1050 (1976), held that an insurance policy containing
language identical to that in clause (a) and clause (o), cited
supra, was ambiguous when compared to each other.

The Arizona

court said:
The policy must be read as a whole in order
to give reasonable and harmonious meaning
and effect to all of its provisions.
Reading the clauses together, the court pointed out that
more than one construction of the provisions was possible.

It went

on to hold the clauses to be ambiguous and construed them nost strongly
against the insurer and in favor of the insured.
A Louisiana court, in Hendricks Electrical Company, Inc. v.
Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, La. App., 1974, 297 So.2d 470, construed a general liability insurance clause identical to clause (o)
as excluding only the damage to the property actually being worked
on by the contractor (an electrical switch).

It did not exclude

coverage for the entire building which was damaged by a fire caused
by the negligence of the contractor in working on the switch.

See

also Roland Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
72 Wash.2d 682, 434 P.2d 725 (1967).
Admittedly, some courts have found the language of clause (k)
and clause (o), cited supra, to be clear and unambiguous.

However,

the logic of Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Company of
Wisconsin v. Puyear Wood Products Company, Supra, appears irrebuttable:
The very fact that courts of similar
jurisdictions have arrived at different
construction as to the meaning of the
words under discussion, and even in some
instances have gone so far as to take
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almost opposite views, is certainly some
indication that the terms in the context
used are ambiguous.
See also Federal Insurance Company
.
, I nc.,
_ _ v · P . A . T . Homes

~

at 1052.
Ambiguity in an insurance contract results in strict construction against the insurer.

This rule of strict construction

is no different when the "care, custody and control" or clause~
exclusions are involved.

Federal Insurance Com an

v. P. A. T, i:i

Inc., Supra; United State Fire Insurance Company v. Schnabel,

so;

P.2d 847 (Alas. 1972); Boswell v. Travelers Indemnity Companz,
38 N.J.Super. 599, 120 A.2d 250

(1956); Innis v. McDonald, 77 Ohi:

L.Abs. 417, 150 N.E.2d 441 (1956).
Ambiguity in a written insurance contract also creates

an
I

interpretive question within the exclusive purview of the jury.
75 Am. Jur.2d, Trials, §411, states the rule in these words:
While it is true as a general rule that the
construction of written contracts belongs
to the court and not the jury, there are
nevertheless cases in which the ambiguous
nature of the words used or an obscure
reference to unexplained circumstances
requires that the interpretation of the
language be left to the consideration of
the jury for the purpose of carrying into
effect the real intention of the parties.
It is for the jury to determine what is
the agreement of the parties, where there
is uncertainty in a written contract because
of ambiguity or incompleteness or technical
words or terms of art.
Certainly in this case there is uncertainty in the writW
·
· t ies.
·
contract b ecause o f a mb i.gui

Therefore, i.· t i.· s proper that th!

jury decide what the contract was to mean in light of the particu·
lar circumstances of the case.
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B.

THE QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHO HAD CARE
CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE BUILDING PREMISES
WAS RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, AND,
THEREFORE, THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE.

Overson was hired by Stephenson's to essentially be the
erection and installation subcontractor.
pp. 12, 13).

(Trial Court Transcript,

Other parties were hired, either by Stephenson's or

Triple "C" Farms, to carry out the other necessary functions in
construction.

(Trial Court Transcript, pp. 13-15, 23).

Stephenson's

oversaw the entire project, apparently serving as the general contractor.

(Trial Court Transcript, pp. 25,26).

Stephenson, Stephenson's

employees, and all the various subcontractors were on and off the
job site from the beginning of construction until the day of the
fire.

(Trial Court Transcript, pp. 38-40).

Also, other interested

parties outside the general and subcontractors, were at the job site
on a regular basis.

(Trial Court Transcript, p. 40).

It is apparent that the job site was not the exclusive
domain of Overson and his employees.

Rather, a number of different

parties had unrestricted access to the building site during the
entire construction period.
owner of the job site.
control".

Triple "C" Farms was the record land

Certainly they had possessory "custody and

Stephenson's, apparently acting as the general contractor

of the project, had the physical "custody and control" of the job
site.

Each subcontractor as he came on to the job site had the

same "custody and control" as Overson.
In light of all the various parties participating, which
one or ones had the "care, custody or control" spoken of in the

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

insurance policy provisions?

If more than one party had "care,

custody or control", does it negate any "care, custody or contra;
that Overson might have had?

The insurance policy provisions re),

upon by the insurance company leave these questions and many othe·
unanswered.

I

Therefore, a factual question for the jury in light

of the particular facts of this case, exists as to whether Overso•.
had the requisite "care, custody or control" to trigger the clair;:
policy exclusions.

This issue was clearly raised by the exarninat::

and cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses in the trial court.
It is the province of the jury to r:take factual deterrnina·
tions.

The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff his

!

ri~tt

have the jury make the determinations of the facts in this case.
That a fact issue for the jury existed was demonstrated
the trial judge himself.

bi

Two motions for summary judgments by the

defendant before trial were denied.

(Trial Record, pp. 60,95),

The reason that the court ruled against summary judgment was that
an issue of fact was presented which required jury resolution.
It seems a paradox that after two summary judgment denials, the
trial judge would take the case away from the jury and preclude
their determination of the issues.
That factual issues for the jury are present in this case
can be illustrated by two cases that are factually indistinguishab!:
from this one.

First, General Mutual Insurance Company v. WrilJ.1:!

7 Misc.2d 331, 161 N.Y.Supp.2d 974

(1957), involved a contractor

that had erected a metal framed school building.

During a

violent storm the frame was blown over, causing extensive

-10-
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1

1

damage to the steel and masonry piers which supported it.

General

Mutual, which had insured the contractor from liability, denied
coverage on the basis of a policy clause excluding coverage for
damage to property in the "care, custody or control" of the
insured.

Ruling that the insurance company's position was without

merit, the court stated:
This /plaintiff's/ argument is specious.
It assumes that In order to work on something, you must have custody of it. This
is certainly not true of a large steel
frame furnished by someone else, and being
erected on still another party's property.
The facts of the instant case are almost identical to
those of Wright.

Wright was constructing a steel frame furnished

by someone else on a third party's land.

In our case, Overson was

erecting a steel building from metal furnished by Stephenson's on
Triple "C" Farms' land.

The question of custody is just the same

in our case as it was in the Wright case.
In another case, Anderson v. Brown, 21 Mich.App. 699,
176 N.W.2d 457 (1970), a house on which a contractor was doing
carpentry work and which was 75 percent completed, was destroyed
by fire,

allegedly caused by the contractor's negligence in using

a dangerous heating arrangement.

The contractor brought suit

against his liability insurer for a declaratory judgment regarding
insurance coverage.

The trial court directed a verdict for the

defendant-insurer, holding that the "care, custody or control"
exclusion absolved the insurer of liability.

On appeal, the trial

court's decision was reversed and remanded for two reasons.

One,

the appellate court stated that the meaning of the "care, custody
-11-
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or control" exclusion required a jury interpretation.

Two, the

court held that where evidence established that the house was
nearing completion and that the owners themselves had subcont

ract;

out some of the work, a jury could have reasonably concluded that
the house was not under the "care, custody or control" of the
contractor.
In the instant case, the two quonset huts were also neari:.
completion, and both the owner, Triple "C" Farms, and Stephenson's
had independently contracted out some of the work.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in directing a judgment for the
defendant.

A directed verdict is only appropriate when viewing

the evidence most favorable to the party against whom the motion
is made and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable infer·
ences the minds of reasonable men could not differ.

In our case

the minds of reasonable men could differ as to the outcome for
two reasons.

One, the insurance exclusion is ambiguous and subjec:

to many interpretations; therefore, the responsibility of its
interpretation falls upon the jury.

Two, a factual issue exists

as to the amount of control Overson exerted over the building,

since he was but one of the many parties involved in the construct:·!
process.
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should revers:
the judgment and remand it for a new trial to the jury on the
merits.
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Respectfully submitted
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